Commentary · Oct 2, 2026

    Kazatomprom's costs rose 37 per cent while its realised price trailed spot; the new reactors change neither

    Kazatomprom's first-half results show production up 9 per cent, sales down 1 per cent, a realised price of $67.88 a pound against $85.98 spot, and C1 cash costs up 37 per cent. Kazakhstan's three planned reactors would each need about 400 tonnes of uranium a year, and the first unit is targeted for 2034.

    Cooling towers of Dukovany Nuclear Power Plant on a sunny day with smoke rising.
    Vladimír Sládek / Pexels
    Contents

    Key takeaways

    • Kazatomprom's 1H2026 results (21 August) show production of 13,291 tU on a 100 per cent basis, up 9 per cent; consolidated sales down 1 per cent to 7,586 tU; inventory up 23 per cent to 8,245 tU; and net profit down 9 per cent to KZT 240.4bn.
    • The group's average realised price was USD 67.88 a pound against an average spot price of USD 85.98, while attributable C1 cash cost rose 37 per cent to USD 24.48 a pound; 2026 C1 guidance was raised to USD 25.50-27.00.
    • Kazatomprom said in August 2025 that each of Kazakhstan's three planned nuclear plants would need about 400 tonnes of uranium a year, roughly 72,000 tonnes cumulatively over their lives, according to World Nuclear News; the World Nuclear Association puts 2025 Kazakh output at about 25,839 tU, around 40 per cent of world supply.
    • Russia's Resolution No. 1158 of 12 September introduced a revised approval procedure for sulphuric acid exports until 31 December 2026; Kazatomprom said it expects no material impact on 2026 operations, while commissioning of its own TQZ acid plant slipped six to twelve months to Q3 2027-Q1 2028.

    Kazakhstan signed the construction contract for its first nuclear power plant on 3 September, and a month later the nuclear figure that matters most to the state budget is still not a reactor number but a uranium price. Kazatomprom, the state producer at the centre of a country NucNet puts at about 40 per cent of global uranium supply, reported on 21 August that revenue rose, profit fell and unit costs climbed by more than a third. Chief executive Meirzhan Yussupov's claim that "pricing power has returned to producers with proven and large uranium reserves" is being tested against the company's own cost line, not against demand from the reactors Astana is about to build.

    A small customer at home

    Kazatomprom said in August 2025 that each of Kazakhstan's three planned nuclear plants would require about 400 tonnes of uranium a year, and that over their full operating lives the three could amount to cumulative demand of roughly 72,000 tonnes, according to World Nuclear News. The World Nuclear Association puts Kazakh output in 2025 at about 25,839 tonnes of uranium, roughly 40 per cent of the world total. The two figures run on different clocks: the first plant, two VVER-1200 units totalling 2,400 MW in the Zhambyl district of Almaty region, is to begin construction in 2027 and run its first unit in 2034.

    The contract itself is settled business. Rosatom signed the EPC agreement with Kazakhstan Nuclear Power Plants on 3 September, at a reported cost of about USD 14.4 billion for the two units, according to World Nuclear News. A second station, approved in early 2026 on a site alongside the first near Lake Balkhash, is expected to use China National Nuclear Corporation technology, NucNet reported.

    President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev has framed the programme as a remedy for the "historical absurdity" of a leading uranium producer with no nuclear capacity, according to NucNet, which also reports that coal supplies roughly half of Kazakhstan's energy and that the target is about 5 per cent nuclear generation by 2035. It is an electricity project, not a near-term buyer of Kazakh uranium.

    What the first half shows

    Kazatomprom's volumes are rising faster than its sales. First-half production reached 13,291 tU on a 100 per cent basis, up 9 per cent, while consolidated sales volume fell 1 per cent to 7,586 tU. Finished-goods inventory rose 23 per cent to 8,245 tU, which the company attributes to exactly that: higher production and lower sales than a year earlier.

    Revenue was KZT 717.8 billion, up 9 per cent, but net profit fell 9 per cent to KZT 240.4 billion, which the company attributes to larger foreign-exchange losses, higher finance costs and a rise in cost of sales. The group's average realised price was USD 67.88 a pound against an average spot price of USD 85.98, so contracted sales are still catching up with the market. Attributable C1 cash cost was USD 24.48 a pound, up 37 per cent on higher mineral extraction tax, sulphuric acid prices and a stronger tenge.

    The guidance moved accordingly. Kazatomprom cut full-year revenue guidance to KZT 2.1-2.2 trillion and raised C1 cost guidance to USD 25.50-27.00 a pound, while holding 2026 production at 27,500-29,000 tU. It also lowered its exchange-rate assumption to 490 tenge per dollar from 540, and attributes the revenue revision primarily to that tenge appreciation and to higher purchase prices for materials, sulphuric acid in particular.

    Holding the price

    The company's answer to a soft realised price is restraint, not volume. In August 2025 it cut its nominal 2026 production level to 29,697 tU from 32,777 tU, a reduction of about 3,000 tU that World Nuclear News described as roughly 5 per cent of world primary supply, most of it at the Budenovskoye joint venture. Yussupov told World Nuclear News in August that "the era of 'cheap' uranium is fading away" and that "every single pound we produce will have a clear, committed, and waiting buyer", adding that long-term price indicators had reached an 18-year maximum.

    The market has not contradicted him. Cameco's published price series, calculated from month-end prices reported by UxC and TradeTech, puts the September 2026 spot price at USD 89.63 a pound and the long-term price at USD 96.50, the latter unchanged from August. The distance between that long-term indicator and Kazatomprom's realised price measures how much of the current market the company has yet to capture.

    Where the risk sits

    The constraints are upstream and political. On 12 September the Russian government adopted Resolution No. 1158, introducing a revised approval procedure for sulphuric acid exports that is expected to run until 31 December 2026. Kazatomprom, whose in-situ recovery operations depend on the reagent, said its Russian suppliers had confirmed readiness to meet 2026 contracts and that it expects no material impact on operations or 2026 production guidance. Its own answer to that dependency has slipped: commissioning of the TQZ sulphuric acid plant has been pushed back six to twelve months, to between the third quarter of 2027 and the first quarter of 2028, after paleontological findings at the site.

    Further down the chain the dependencies are starker. Kazakhstan has no domestic conversion or enrichment capacity, and material must be sent to Russia or Canada for conversion, according to the World Nuclear Association, which also records Kazatomprom's 10 per cent interest in the International Uranium Enrichment Centre at Angarsk. On the demand side, the association reports that China now takes more than half of Kazakhstan's production. Two pending supply contracts, with China's State Nuclear Uranium Resource Development Company and Rosatom's Uranium One Group, went to shareholders with absentee voting closing on 6 October, Trend reported; volumes and values were not disclosed.

    What to watch

    • Kazatomprom's investor mine tour on 6-7 October and its next quarterly operations update, for any revision to sales, inventory or cost guidance.
    • The shareholder vote closing 6 October on the SNURDC and Uranium One Group supply contracts, and whether volumes are later disclosed.
    • Whether Russian sulphuric acid export approvals are granted in practice before the 31 December deadline, and how the TQZ delay is reflected when 2027 guidance is set.
    • The tenge: guidance now assumes 490 per dollar, so a move either way changes tenge revenue independently of the uranium price.

    For Astana the reactors are an electricity project with a 2034 horizon. The uranium revenue arrives now, and on the first-half numbers it rests on a price the company is choosing to defend, a cost base it is not yet containing, and a reagent it buys from Russia.

    Sources

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