Policy briefs · Oct 4, 2026

    The EU closed Ukraine's 2026 gap with its own debt, and Russia's €210bn is now a repayment question

    The Commission said on 1 October that Ukraine has no external financing gap left for 2026, and disbursed €2.9bn the next day. The money came from EU joint borrowing, not immobilised Russian assets, so the reparations loan has become the mechanism for repaying a debt the EU has already taken on.

    Close-up of various Euro banknotes scattered on a surface, highlighting European currency.
    Ibrahim Boran / Pexels
    Contents

    Key takeaways

    • Commission chief spokesperson Paula Pinho said after a 1 October EU-Ukraine meeting that "we came to a conclusion, together with our Ukrainian friends, that there is no financial gap" for 2026; Euronews reported the same day that President Zelenskyy had flagged a $27bn shortfall in late August and later cut the figure to $20bn (Evropeiska Pravda, Euronews).
    • The Commission disbursed €2.9bn on 2 October, including €800m for the first time under the Ukraine Facility component of the Ukraine Support Loan, and put total EU and member-state support since 2022 at €227.4bn, of which €3.8bn came from immobilised Russian assets (European Commission).
    • Finance Minister Sergii Marchenko put Ukraine's 2027 shortfall at $78bn — $32.6bn budgetary and $45bn military — against the €45bn the €90bn Ukraine Support Loan allocates to 2027 (Euronews, 1 October 2026).
    • The Commission's 14 January 2026 package states that the EU "reserves its right to use the Russian assets immobilised in the Union to repay the loan" and that the reparations loan proposed on 3 December 2025 "remains available if co-legislators choose to pursue it" (European Commission).

    The European Commission has declared Ukraine's 2026 financing problem solved. Its chief spokesperson, Paula Pinho, said after a joint meeting with Ukrainian officials on 1 October that "we came to a conclusion, together with our Ukrainian friends, that there is no financial gap", Evropeiska Pravda reported the following day; on 2 October the Commission disbursed a further €2.9bn. None of that money came from Russia. It came from EU joint borrowing agreed in December 2025 after the reparations loan built on immobilised Russian central-bank assets failed to win Belgian consent. That choice has changed what the €210bn is for. It is no longer the instrument that funds Ukraine; it is the instrument that is supposed to repay the EU.

    What was actually closed

    The gap that closed on 1 October was a 2026 gap, and a contested one. Euronews reported that President Volodymyr Zelenskyy had flagged a shortfall of $27bn in late August and later reduced it to $20bn, and that the Commission had been reluctant to validate either figure. As late as 11 September, Commission spokesperson Balázs Ujvári told reporters in Brussels that "we need to establish the needs before we can potentially discuss ways of addressing it", according to Evropeiska Pravda.

    The resolution was arithmetic rather than new money. Euronews put roughly $37bn as still available to Kyiv before year-end through the support loan and the Ukraine Facility. The Commission's own figures for the 2 October tranche are more precise: €2.9bn disbursed, including €800m paid for the first time under the Ukraine Facility component of the Ukraine Support Loan, the eighth disbursement under the Facility, against total EU and member-state support since 2022 of €227.4bn. Of that cumulative total, the Commission attributes €3.8bn to immobilised Russian assets — proceeds and windfall profits, not principal.

    The 2027 numbers do not match the instrument

    The €90bn Ukraine Support Loan is split €60bn for defence capabilities and defence-industrial capacity and €30bn for budget support, and is divided evenly between the two years: €45bn for 2026, of which the Commission allocated €16.7bn to budget support and €28.3bn to defence, and €45bn for 2027. Against the 2027 half, Finance Minister Sergii Marchenko told Euronews on 1 October that Ukraine faces a $78bn shortfall — $32.6bn budgetary and $45bn military. Evropeiska Pravda reported in September that the €90bn was acknowledged to cover around two-thirds of Ukraine's combined 2026-27 needs. The IMF's own arrangement is comparatively small: a 48-month Extended Fund Facility of US$8.1bn agreed in November 2025, whose first review the Fund's Executive Board completed on 20 July 2026 alongside the 2026 Article IV consultation. The currencies differ and the categories overlap, so the two figures cannot be subtracted from one another; what can be said is that the loan was never scaled to the whole of 2027 and that no second instrument exists.

    Repayment, not funding

    The December 2025 settlement left the Russian assets in place and attached them to the EU's own liability. On 11 December the Council invoked Article 122 TFEU, which requires only a qualified majority, to immobilise €210bn of Russian central-bank assets indefinitely — €185bn held at Euroclear in Brussels and some €25bn in private banks in France, Germany, Sweden and Cyprus, on Euronews's account — with release conditional on Russia having ceased to pose substantial risks and having paid for the damage.

    The Commission's package of 14 January 2026 is explicit about why that matters: the EU "reserves its right to use the Russian assets immobilised in the Union to repay the loan, in full accordance with EU and international law", and the reparations loan proposed on 3 December 2025 "remains available if co-legislators choose to pursue it". Ukraine repays the €90bn only if and when Russia pays reparations. Economy Commissioner Valdis Dombrovskis put the consequence plainly in April 2026, as reported by the Kyiv Independent: the structure "invites a question: what happens if Russia does not pay reparations?" and "we will have to come back to this question."

    Belgium's conditions were bypassed, not met

    Nothing in the December outcome answered Belgium's objections. In a letter to Commission President Ursula von der Leyen dated 27 November 2025, Prime Minister Bart De Wever called the reparations loan "fundamentally wrong" and said "I will never commit Belgium to sustain on its own the risks", demanding "legally binding, unconditional, irrevocable, on-demand, joint and several guarantees" covering the €185bn at Euroclear and any consequential costs, cover for Euroclear's exposure in jurisdictions friendly to Russia, and a full accounting of Russian assets across member states, Euronews reported. After the summit he described the outcome as a win: "Europe has won, and financial stability has certainly won." His conditions did not lapse; they were set aside by changing the instrument, and Hungary, Slovakia and Czechia stayed outside the joint borrowing through enhanced cooperation.

    The pressure to reopen the file is already visible. Euronews reported on 4 September that Sweden, Poland, the Netherlands and Spain had urged the Commission to revive the shelved proposal, and that Marchenko wanted custodianship of the assets moved from Belgium to EU control to "mitigate the risk" — a change that would relocate the legal exposure De Wever refused to bear alone. The Commission's line at that point was that the €90bn should suffice through 2027. Ukraine financing is on the agenda of the European Council on 15-16 October in Brussels, alongside the next multiannual financial framework, under which the Commission has proposed post-2027 support for Ukraine from the EU budget itself.

    What to watch

    • Whether the 15-16 October European Council instructs the Commission to bring forward binding legal text on the reparations loan, or repeats December's commitment to continue work on legal and technical details.
    • Whether Belgium's November 2025 conditions — joint and several guarantees exceeding the €185bn at Euroclear — are tabled again in any revived proposal, and whether Italy and others restate their reservations.
    • Whether the 2027 tranche of the Ukraine Support Loan is front-loaded or supplemented, given Marchenko's $78bn figure and the absence of any instrument beyond the €45bn allocated.
    • Whether post-2027 support for Ukraine is secured inside the 2028-34 budget negotiation, which would remove the reparations loan's role as the EU's repayment source without resolving who bears the loss if Russia never pays.

    Sources

    Related publications

    Policy briefs · Europe

    France's Barnier Budget Survives by Seven Votes as Left Coalition Demands Pension Rollback

    Prime Minister Michel Barnier's 2027 austerity budget survived a National Assembly confidence motion by the narrowest margin since the Fifth Republic's founding, with 289 deputies voting to support against 282 opposing. The left-wing Nouveau Front Populaire bloc had tabled an amendment demanding the reversal of Macron-era pension reforms as a condition for support, which Barnier refused. French ten-year bond spreads over German Bunds widened to 82 basis points in the aftermath, a level last seen during the 2011-12 eurozone crisis.

    Policy briefs · Europe

    Italy's Meloni Coalition Fractures Over EU Budget Compliance Letter as Lega Threatens Veto

    The Italian government of Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni faces a coalition crisis after the European Commission issued a formal compliance letter demanding revisions to Rome's 2027 draft budget, which projects a deficit of 3.6 percent of GDP. Deputy Prime Minister Matteo Salvini's Lega party has threatened to veto any budget revision that reduces promised tax-cut pledges, while the Commission has set a 90-day window for Italy to submit a revised trajectory. The standoff tests the durability of Italy's centre-right governing arrangement ahead of regional elections in Lombardy.

    Policy briefs · Europe

    Russia's GDP Growth Revised Down to 1.8% as Military Spending Reaches 41% of Federal Budget

    Russia's Federal State Statistics Service (Rosstat) revised its 2025 GDP growth figure to 1.8 percent, down from an earlier estimate of 2.4 percent, citing weaker-than-expected performance in manufacturing and real estate. The 2026 federal budget draft presented by the Finance Ministry allocates approximately 41 percent of total expenditure to defence and security — the highest share since the Soviet period — while facing a non-oil revenue shortfall that requires accelerated drawdown from the National Wealth Fund, Russia's sovereign reserve mechanism.