Poland's EU Council Presidency Pivots to Defence Spending and Enlargement as Central Agenda

Background

Poland's assumption of the rotating EU Council Presidency is the country's second, following its previous presidency in 2011, and arrives at a moment of exceptional strategic salience for Warsaw. Poland shares a border with Ukraine, Belarus, the Kaliningrad exclave of Russia, and three NATO allies, giving it a unique vantage point on the security dynamics reshaping European politics. The Tusk government, which came to office in December 2023 following the defeat of the Law and Justice party in parliamentary elections, has pursued a strategy of deep EU integration combined with aggressive defence spending increases, positioning Poland as the leading voice for a more capable and strategically autonomous EU defence posture. Polish defence spending reached 4.7 percent of GDP in 2026, the highest proportion in NATO, reflecting Warsaw's assessment of the near-term threat environment on its eastern border. Tusk has cultivated close relationships with the Macron government in France, the Merz government in Germany, and the Baltic and Nordic state governments, building a coalition within the EU that supports using the presidency to lock in durable institutional frameworks for defence cooperation rather than relying on ad hoc arrangements that could be unwound by future political changes in major member states.

Presidency Agenda

The Polish presidency programme, presented to the European Parliament on October 15, 2026, identifies six legislative priorities. The most ambitious is a proposed EU Defence Industrial Base Regulation that would create a permanent mechanism for coordinating member state procurement, pooling production capacity, and providing EU budget co-financing for joint defence projects. This regulation would go substantially further than the European Defence Investment Programme and the Defence Production Act instruments adopted during the 2022 to 2025 period, creating a standing EU defence procurement authority with its own budget line rather than relying on emergency instruments. The second priority is advancing Ukraine's EU accession through the completion of screening reports for the first six accession chapters, a process that Poland's European affairs minister has committed to completing by March 2027. Third, Poland plans to convene a High-Level Conference on EU Enlargement in Warsaw in February 2027 bringing together heads of government from all candidate and potential candidate countries alongside EU member state leaders, aiming to produce a renewed political commitment to the accession process timeline. On budget, Poland will coordinate the opening round of formal MFF negotiations for 2028 to 2034, a task that requires managing the competing demands of net contributor states including the Netherlands, cohesion fund beneficiary states in central and eastern Europe, and the new funding demands created by Ukraine's accession candidacy. The presidency will also oversee negotiations on a proposed EU-Ukraine Security Partnership framework, which goes beyond previous bilateral instruments by creating a structured cooperation mechanism for intelligence sharing, equipment co-production, and joint training.

• EU Defence Industrial Base Regulation proposed as flagship legislative achievement: permanent procurement coordination authority with EU budget co-financing.
• Screening reports for first 6 Ukraine accession chapters targeted for completion by March 2027.
• High-Level Enlargement Conference planned for Warsaw in February 2027.
• MFF 2028-2034 opening round will be managed under Polish presidency.

Strategic Positioning

Poland's presidency agenda reflects a broader strategic calculation by the Tusk government that the window for institutionalising European defence cooperation at the EU level is narrowing and must be seized while the political conditions across major member states remain favourable. Tusk has spoken publicly about his concern that political change in France or Germany could produce governments less committed to the defence integration agenda, and that the presidency offers Poland an opportunity to advance the legislative architecture before that risk materialises. The Polish agenda has been welcomed by the Baltic states and Scandinavian NATO members, which see EU defence industrial coordination as a complement to NATO's military posture, and by Ukraine, which has a direct interest in the EU accession and security partnership elements. France has been supportive of the defence industrial base regulation concept as it aligns with Paris's longstanding preference for European strategic autonomy, while Germany under Merz has moved from its previous ambivalence about EU defence structures to active engagement, seeing them as compatible with and reinforcing of the transatlantic relationship. The most significant risk to the Polish presidency agenda is the MFF negotiation, which requires unanimity among 27 member states and faces resistance from multiple directions: net contributor states demanding cuts, cohesion beneficiaries resisting redistribution, and new demands from Ukraine accession that neither camp is currently prepared to fund. Polish officials privately acknowledge that a comprehensive MFF deal before April 2027 is unlikely and that the presidency's realistic ambition is to achieve sufficient negotiating progress to allow its successor, Denmark, to conclude the deal.

Sources

• Polish Presidency of the EU Council
• Politico EU
• Euractiv
• Reuters
• European Council