Belarus trades prisoners for US relief; its neighbours hold the route

Since December 2025 the United States has eased sanctions on Belarus in return for the release of prisoners. The relief is real in law: Belarus's main potash producers, two state banks and its Finance Ministry have come off US sanctions lists. In trade it has so far changed little. Belarusian potash reaches the sea through Russia, and the routes that would change that run through Lithuania and Poland, which remain bound by EU sanctions and their own disputes with Minsk.

What the exchanges have delivered

The pattern was set on 13 December 2025, when Belarus released 123 prisoners, among them the Nobel laureate Ales Bialiatski, and the US envoy John Coale announced that Washington would lift sanctions on potash. On 19 March 2026 President Alexander Lukashenko pardoned 250 people, the largest single release in the country's history, according to AP. In return the US agreed to lift sanctions on two state banks and the Finance Ministry and to remove the main potash producers from its sanctions list. Coale described the release as a significant humanitarian milestone.

Poland took part in the same diplomacy. On 28 April 2026 the Polish-Belarusian journalist Andrzej Poczobut, jailed since 2021, was freed in a five-for-five exchange at the border that also involved Russians and Moldovans. Prime Minister Donald Tusk called it the end of a two-year diplomatic game in which the US, Romania and Moldova had helped. Coale said the US had helped secure the release of three Polish nationals and two Moldovans.

The releases have not closed the question. At the time of the March deal the Viasna human rights group counted more than 1,100 political prisoners still held. The opposition leader Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya welcomed the releases while arguing, in May, that it was not the time to ease sanctions.

An economy slowing on one market

Belarus enters this bargaining with a weak hand at home. According to the national statistics committee, GDP grew 2.1 per cent year on year in January–July 2026, up from only 0.2 per cent in January–April. The government's target is at least 2.8 per cent for the year. External forecasters, Interfax reports, expect between 1.1 and 1.5 per cent. A GDP deflator of about 113 per cent means that prices are still rising much faster than output.

The dependence on Russia is structural. By early 2023 Russia accounted for 66.3 per cent of Belarus's trade, up from about 40 per cent in 2015–20, and China for 9.2 per cent, while the EU's share fell from about 30 to 12 per cent, according to the Bertelsmann Transformation Index. The same report describes Belarus as Russia's largest sovereign debtor, with obligations of nearly $7.75bn. These figures predate 2025, and more recent official breakdowns by partner are sparse; the direction of change since then has not reversed.

Potash is where the reorientation is most visible. Belaruskali accounts for roughly 15 per cent of world output, RFE/RL reports, and is the largest single source of state revenue. Since Lithuania stopped transit through Klaipėda in 2022, the fertiliser has been shipped through Russian ports such as Ust-Luga and St Petersburg. Carnegie's analysis argues that the redirection moved port and rail income from Lithuania to Russia rather than cutting Belarusian exports off.

Why US relief meets an EU wall

US sanctions relief allows American companies to buy Belarusian potash. It does not lift the EU's ban on importing Belarusian potassium fertilisers, and it does not oblige an EU member to let the cargo cross its territory. On 22 May RFE/RL reported a US diplomatic document proposing to explore routes for Belarusian potash through Lithuania, Poland and Ukraine, citing interest from US firms and global fertiliser shortages. Ukraine confirmed receipt without comment; Poland did not respond; Lithuania denied receiving the proposal, although its foreign minister, Kęstutis Budrys, acknowledged US pressure on the transit question.

Reopening Klaipėda would require either an EU decision, which needs unanimity, or a national legal route around the ban. Neither is in sight, and Belarus has taken the dispute to arbitration: Carnegie reports that Belaruskali is seeking €12bn in damages from Lithuania over the loss of port access. The two tracks also measure success differently. For Washington the deliverable is the release of named prisoners. In Brussels any change needs all 27 members, and Lithuania, which bore most of the cost of closing the route, holds a veto like everyone else.

What it costs Lithuania and Poland

For Lithuania the arithmetic is uncomfortable. Belarusian potash once made up about a third of Klaipėda's turnover. In 2022, the first full year without it, the port's turnover fell by roughly 20 per cent, and Lithuanian Railways lost around €100m a year, which the government had to compensate, according to Carnegie. The case for reopening is commercial. The case against is political and legal, and so far it has prevailed.

The border has also become a site of friction in its own right. In October 2025 Lithuania closed or restricted its crossings after balloons carrying contraband cigarettes disrupted operations at Vilnius airport. Prime Minister Inga Ruginienė called them a hybrid attack. Minsk denied involvement: the foreign ministry accused Lithuanian politicians of exploiting the situation, and Lukashenko said Belarus would apologise if its guilt were proven. Lithuanian trucks were then held at designated sites in Belarus for about four months. After Lukashenko authorised their release on 24 March 2026, some 860 had returned by mid-April, LRT reported, but payment of storage fees was complicated because the Belarusian operator is under EU sanctions.

Poland's position is less exposed but similar in structure. The Poczobut exchange showed that Warsaw will deal with Minsk on specific cases when the US helps broker them. It has not said publicly whether it would carry Belarusian potash, and it did not answer RFE/RL's question on the US request.

What to watch

Three indicators will show whether the two tracks converge. The first is any EU discussion of the potash import ban at the next renewal of Belarus sanctions. The second is a further US–Belarus exchange: the logic of the deals so far is that each release buys a specific delisting. The third is Belarusian export data. If US buyers take significant volumes while the western routes stay closed, the cargo will still leave through Russian ports. That would show how far a change in one country's sanctions can go when the transit states have not changed theirs.

Sources

• Associated Press (via Yahoo News) — Belarus releases 250 political prisoners in a deal with the US to lift some sanctions
• Al Jazeera — Belarus eyes Western ties as it frees journalist Andrzej Poczobut
• RFE/RL — Exclusive: US asks Lithuania, Poland, Ukraine to allow Belarusian fertilizer exports
• Carnegie Endowment — Lithuania's potash dilemma raises questions about sanctions' effectiveness
• Interfax — Belarus's GDP growth accelerates to 2.1% in Jan-July 2026
• Bertelsmann Stiftung — BTI 2026 Belarus Country Report
• Al Jazeera — Lithuania extends Belarus border closure over balloon attack
• LRT — Lithuanian carriers have recovered over half of trucks detained in Belarus