EU sanctions on Russia: longer renewals, bigger lists, harder bargains

September brought two decisions on the EU's Russia sanctions that point in different directions. The first makes the existing regime harder to unpick: individual listings no longer need to be renewed every six months. The second extends it further than any previous round: the next set of listings would be the largest the EU has adopted. Between them lies a negotiation that shows how the bloc's sanctions policy now works. Every renewal and every new package has become an occasion for individual capitals to extract something in return, and the targets that remain are ones where Europe's own industries carry part of the cost.

What the Council decided on 22 September

The Council extended the individual listings under its regime for those undermining Ukraine's territorial integrity for 36 months rather than the usual six, EU Today reports. The measures, which include asset freezes, travel bans and a ban on making funds available, cover roughly 3,000 individuals and entities. In March the Council had renewed them only until 15 September, when they covered around 2,600. Disagreement over two names pushed the regime to its expiry date, and member states first agreed a seven-day extension while they negotiated.

The two names were Alisher Usmanov and Mikhail Fridman, whose listings were allowed to lapse. According to EU diplomats cited by EU Today, France pushed for Usmanov's removal and Luxembourg backed Fridman's. Slovakia had also pressed for changes involving both men. Three other individuals and one entity were not renewed, and three deceased individuals were removed. Latvia was the last state holding out. It abstained rather than block the decision, and its cabinet instructed the foreign ministry to draft national sanctions against both men. Prime Minister Andris Kulbergs framed the choice as one between two individuals and the future of sanctions on thousands. Ukraine's foreign minister, Andrii Sybiha, called the delisting 'shameful and unjustifiable'.

The price of unanimity

The three-year term was the main gain. Because sanctions require unanimity, a single government could previously threaten the entire list twice a year in order to win a concession on one name. That lever is now available only once every three years, although individual listings can still be challenged in court or amended by the Council.

The way the deal was reached is more troubling for the regime's credibility. Euractiv, as reported by UNITED24 Media, says France cited national security and its efforts to free French citizens detained in Azerbaijan. UA.NEWS, also citing Euractiv, notes that Azerbaijan's president pardoned a French citizen, Martin Ryan, the day after Usmanov was delisted, and that diplomats linked the two events. Philipp Lausberg of the European Policy Centre told Euractiv that EU sanctions have shifted since 2022 from energy security towards corporate and foreign-policy interests, and that 'the easy targets are mostly gone'. Oil, gas, raw materials, export controls and finance have largely been covered. What remains is the shadow fleet, financial intermediaries, crypto platforms and third-country companies that help Russia evade export controls, and these are harder to hit.

The next package: breadth over new sectors

The EU's answer has been volume. A proposal by the European External Action Service obtained by the Kyiv Independent would add 827 entities and 744 individuals, nearly 1,600 listings in all and the largest single set to date. They are concentrated in Russia's defence-industrial complex: shipyards, aviation and aerospace firms, electronics makers and armoured-vehicle repair plants. Many are already sanctioned by the United States or other partners, and the document cites their recent inclusion in Russia's official register of military-industrial firms, which entitles them to federal subsidies. EU ambassadors are scheduled to adopt the list on 7 October and foreign ministers on 12 October. After that, the EU intends to adopt smaller lists on a rolling basis rather than large packages.

Ukraine's sanctions commissioner, Vladyslav Vlasiuk, told a briefing in September that a smaller package targeting Russian ballistic-missile producers and their suppliers could come in early October, with the full 22nd package proposed in mid-to-late October. He said it could cover defence industry, trade and finance, and might tighten restrictions on aluminium and some production equipment. The 21st package, adopted in July, targeted drone makers, ship-servicing crews, oil refineries and crypto platforms.

Where the remaining targets hurt Europeans

The aluminium line leads straight to Ireland. The Aughinish refinery in County Limerick, owned by Rusal, is Europe's largest alumina plant, and the EU is discussing restrictions on alumina exports to Russia that would affect it. The figures on its exposure differ by source. Semafor reports that 68 per cent of the plant's 2025 output went to Russia. Fakti, citing Ireland's statistics office, puts Russia's share of its alumina exports at 43 per cent in 2025, about 776,000 tonnes, rising to nearly 49 per cent in the first half of 2026. An investigation by The Irish Times and OCCRP traced Irish alumina to Russian smelters and to a Moscow sales company that supplies defence firms. It did not establish that specific shipments ended up in weapons, because alumina is mixed with other feedstock. Rusal itself is not sanctioned, although its founder, Oleg Deripaska, is.

The plant argues that sanctions would close it, with the possible loss of 1,000 jobs, according to The Economist as cited by Semafor. An Irish lawmaker told The New York Times that it would not close down Russia, it would close down Limerick. This is the trade-off Lausberg describes: a measure with a plausible security case that falls heavily on one member state, which can then make its consent conditional.

Frozen assets and the American act

Two other files will shape the October debate. The first is Russia's immobilised central bank assets. Forbes reports that 122 MEPs have written to EU leaders before the 15–16 October European Council asking them to revisit using the assets for Ukraine. Sweden, the Netherlands, Poland and Spain made a similar call in August. Europe holds about €210bn of these assets, €185bn of it at Euroclear in Belgium, according to Reuters figures cited by Forbes. Belgium still opposes their use. In December 2025 the EU instead agreed a €90bn loan, finalised in April, and froze the assets indefinitely under an emergency treaty provision, which removed one more six-month veto point. Russia's central bank has sued the EU at the General Court, and a Moscow court has ordered Euroclear to pay compensation.

The second is Washington. President Donald Trump has signed the Lindsey O. Graham Sanctioning Russia and Iran Act of 2026, RTÉ reported on 19 September. It targets Russia's energy and defence sectors and the shadow fleet, and authorises tariffs of up to 100 per cent on major buyers of Russian oil and gas. The House had passed it by 262 votes to 159. If the authority is used, it would cover secondary measures that the EU has so far avoided, such as action against Chinese banks, which Euractiv says the EU is discussing separately.

What to watch

• Whether ambassadors adopt the roughly 1,600 listings on 7 October without new demands for exemptions, and whether the switch to rolling lists survives its first test.
• Whether alumina restrictions reach the 22nd package, and on what terms for Aughinish, which would be the clearest case yet of the EU sanctioning flows from a plant on its own territory.
• Whether Latvia's national measures against Usmanov and Fridman are followed by other member states, as Ukraine has asked.
• Whether the 15–16 October European Council reopens the use of frozen assets or leaves the €90bn loan as the EU's main instrument.

Sources

• Mezha — EU Prepares 22nd Russia Sanctions Package Targeting Military Industry and Finance
• RTÉ — Trump signs sanctions bill targeting Russia
• The Kyiv Independent — Exclusive: EU readies biggest-ever sanctions package targeting Russia's war machine
• EU Today — EU Extends Russia Sanctions for Three Years After Delisting Usmanov and Fridman
• UNITED24 Media — Easy Targets Are Mostly Gone as EU Faces Internal Trade-Offs Over Russian Sanctions
• UA.NEWS — It's becoming increasingly difficult for the EU to agree on new sanctions against Russia — Euractiv
• Semafor — Irish factory could face EU sanctions over ties to Russia
• Fakti.bg — EU discusses sanctions against Irish refinery linked to Russian aluminum giant Rusal
• Forbes (via Yahoo News) — EU States Revive Push To Use Frozen Russian Assets For Ukraine