Policy briefs · Oct 2, 2026

    US metals tariffs still sit above the EU deal's 15 per cent ceiling, and the threatened digital probe has not been opened

    US proclamations in force keep steel and aluminium at 50 per cent and most derivatives at 25 per cent, so the EU's 31 December test for suspending concessions looks likely to be met. The Section 301 case Trump announced over the Google fine has still not been opened.

    Container ships docked at Tollerort Terminal, Hamburg during sunset.
    Bernd von Darl / Pexels
    Contents

    Key takeaways

    • The European Commission says the framework entered into force on 1 July 2026, with the US tariff capped at 15 per cent on most EU exports including cars, semiconductors, pharmaceuticals and lumber.
    • Regulation (EU) 2026/1455 lets the Commission suspend concessions if the US still applies more than 15 per cent to EU steel and aluminium derivatives on 31 December 2026, and requires a report to Parliament and Council by 1 December.
    • Proclamation 11021 of 2 April 2026 set 50 per cent on steel and aluminium articles and 25 per cent on most derivatives; the reduced 15 per cent band that Proclamation 11032 of 1 June extended to some EU goods runs only to 31 December 2027.
    • The Commission fined Google €890m on 23 July 2026 and Trump said the next day the US would “immediately” open a Section 301 investigation; no initiation notice for it had appeared in the Federal Register as of 2 October.

    The EU-US tariff framework has applied since 1 July 2026, and the two questions it left open are both close to a deadline. Under the EU's implementing regulation, the Commission may suspend its own concessions if the United States is still charging more than 15 per cent on EU steel and aluminium derivatives on 31 December 2026. On the evidence of the US proclamations in force, it will be. The second question, Washington's threatened trade case against EU digital enforcement, has instead gone quiet: more than two months after Trump announced it, no initiation notice has appeared in the Federal Register.

    What the framework locked in

    The European Commission says the framework entered into force on 1 July 2026, with the US tariff capped at 15 per cent as a ceiling across most sectors, including cars, semiconductors, pharmaceuticals and lumber, and zero or near-zero treatment for cork, aircraft and generic pharmaceuticals. On the EU side, Regulation (EU) 2026/1455 eliminated all remaining duties on US industrial goods from the same date and opened twenty zero-duty tariff quotas for agricultural goods. The Commission's 2025 figures show an EU goods surplus of €198bn and a US services surplus of €178bn.

    The guardrails came from the co-legislators, who reached a provisional deal on 20 May 2026 before the Council gave final approval on 25 June. The package carries three instruments of leverage: a safeguard against import surges, a sunset clause ending the regulation at the close of 2029, and the power to suspend concessions on steel and aluminium if the United States still applies more than 15 per cent to EU derivative products by 31 December 2026. The Commission must report to Parliament and Council on that tariff treatment by 1 December. On its own retaliation it moved the other way, extending on 31 July the suspension of measures covering some €93bn of US imports, with no end date.

    The metals ceiling the US has not met

    The August 2025 Joint Statement never promised a metals settlement. On steel, aluminium and their derivatives the two sides recorded only that they "intend to consider the possibility to cooperate on ring-fencing their respective domestic markets from overcapacity", including through tariff-rate quota solutions. Nothing since has converted that into a schedule.

    What happened instead was a restructuring that leaves most of the US regime above the ceiling. Proclamation 11021 of 2 April 2026 applied the Section 232 duties to the full customs value of an import regardless of metal content, and set 50 per cent on steel and aluminium articles, 25 per cent on most derivatives, and a temporarily reduced 15 per cent on fixed industrial machinery and power equipment. Proclamation 11032 of 1 June widened that 15 per cent band to agricultural equipment and residential HVAC and, for a list of mobile industrial equipment, capped the combined rate on products of an EU member nation at 15 per cent, but only to 31 December 2027. In August the Commerce Department sought comment on bringing fourteen further derivative articles into scope.

    The EU has therefore won real carve-outs, but on specific lists and with expiry dates, while the headline rates stand. Bloomberg reported in February that EU officials expected the derivative tariffs to be narrowed within weeks; the lists are instead being extended. The cost is measurable: EU steel exports to the US fell 30 per cent between June and December 2025 against the same period of 2024, on Eurostat data compiled by the industry body Eurofer.

    The digital case that has not been filed

    On 23 July the Commission fined Google €890m under the Digital Markets Act, €460m for self-preferencing its own services in Google Search and €430m for restricting app developers from steering users to cheaper channels on Google Play, and ordered compliance within 60 days on pain of penalties of up to 5 per cent of worldwide turnover. US Trade Representative Jamieson Greer said the same day that "the EU often claims that it is looking for stability and predictability in our trading relationship, but these actions are driving massive uncertainty for U.S. exports".

    The next day Trump wrote that the United States would "immediately" open a Section 301 investigation and that the penalties "will be entirely reversed and, we anticipate, a substantial TARIFF to be placed on them at the earliest possible moment". The timing matters: hours earlier his administration had used the same authority to impose duties of 10 to 12.5 per cent on more than 80 economies, the EU included, over forced labour, and a suit in the Court of International Trade argued this revived tariffs the Supreme Court had struck down. Brussels did not retaliate, arguing the new duties stayed within the cap, and the Commission's chief spokesperson, Paula Pinho, said only: "There's a call for dialogue which we fully embrace."

    Since then, nothing. USTR's Section 301 notices in the Federal Register from July onwards concern Chinese product exclusions, the notorious markets review, the sixty forced-labour cases and Brazil — none an investigation into EU digital rules. Enforcement, by contrast, has carried on: the Commission issued two specification decisions on 16 July requiring Google to share anonymised search data and open Android features to rival AI services, and on 29 September Google appealed both to the General Court, its competition director Oliver Bethell warning they would force it to share private search histories "without sufficient anonymisation". That data-sharing obligation starts in January 2027, after the metals deadline has passed.

    What the evidence does not show

    There is little recent public reporting on the steel channel itself. The last substantive accounts are from the spring, when Maroš Šefčovič saw Greer and Commerce Secretary Howard Lutnick in Washington and said the EU could offer a "digital dialogue" but "cannot give anything that concerns our legislation". Lutnick had put the trade plainly in Brussels in November 2025: find a balanced approach on digital rules, "then we will, together with them, handle the steel and aluminium issues." Nothing sourced since shows either side moving.

    What to watch

    • The Commission's report on US tariff treatment of steel and aluminium derivatives, due by 1 December, and whether it recommends suspending concessions.
    • Any US proclamation before 31 December extending the 15 per cent band, or the tariff-rate quota arrangement the Joint Statement only contemplated.
    • Whether Commerce adds the fourteen proposed derivative articles, which would widen rather than narrow the gap with the ceiling.
    • Whether a Section 301 initiation notice on EU digital rules is ever published, and whether the Commission acts on Google's response to the July decisions.

    Sources

    Related publications

    Policy briefs · Europe

    France's Barnier Budget Survives by Seven Votes as Left Coalition Demands Pension Rollback

    Prime Minister Michel Barnier's 2027 austerity budget survived a National Assembly confidence motion by the narrowest margin since the Fifth Republic's founding, with 289 deputies voting to support against 282 opposing. The left-wing Nouveau Front Populaire bloc had tabled an amendment demanding the reversal of Macron-era pension reforms as a condition for support, which Barnier refused. French ten-year bond spreads over German Bunds widened to 82 basis points in the aftermath, a level last seen during the 2011-12 eurozone crisis.

    Policy briefs · Europe

    Italy's Meloni Coalition Fractures Over EU Budget Compliance Letter as Lega Threatens Veto

    The Italian government of Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni faces a coalition crisis after the European Commission issued a formal compliance letter demanding revisions to Rome's 2027 draft budget, which projects a deficit of 3.6 percent of GDP. Deputy Prime Minister Matteo Salvini's Lega party has threatened to veto any budget revision that reduces promised tax-cut pledges, while the Commission has set a 90-day window for Italy to submit a revised trajectory. The standoff tests the durability of Italy's centre-right governing arrangement ahead of regional elections in Lombardy.

    Policy briefs · Europe

    Russia's GDP Growth Revised Down to 1.8% as Military Spending Reaches 41% of Federal Budget

    Russia's Federal State Statistics Service (Rosstat) revised its 2025 GDP growth figure to 1.8 percent, down from an earlier estimate of 2.4 percent, citing weaker-than-expected performance in manufacturing and real estate. The 2026 federal budget draft presented by the Finance Ministry allocates approximately 41 percent of total expenditure to defence and security — the highest share since the Soviet period — while facing a non-oil revenue shortfall that requires accelerated drawdown from the National Wealth Fund, Russia's sovereign reserve mechanism.