Center for Strategic Studies of Eurasia

    Policy briefs · Oct 2, 2026

    Uzbekistan has named its state banks for sale but set no dates, and a third of credit is still directed

    A presidential decree of 28 August put 98.9 per cent of Turonbank up for public auction, but fixed no date and tied the sale to international consultants' conclusions. Directed and preferential lending was still about 30 per cent of bank credit at end-2024, which ownership change alone will not move.

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    Contents

    Key takeaways

    • A presidential decree of 28 August 2026 puts 98.9 per cent of Turonbank up for public auction among state stakes in 62 enterprises slated for sale over 2026-2027, with the sale left to the Ministry of Economy and Finance and no auction date set (Spot.uz).
    • Directed and preferential lending was around 30 per cent of total banking-sector lending at end-2024, about half its 2018 share; 38.4 per cent of state commercial banks' lending was on preferential terms against 3.1 per cent at private domestic banks (Uzbekistan Financial Sector Assessment Program).
    • The Central Bank of Uzbekistan held its policy rate at 14 per cent on 16 September 2026, with August headline inflation at 6.2 per cent and core inflation at 5.5 per cent; the next meeting is on 28 October (cbu.uz).
    • Growth forecasts for 2026 diverge by more than a percentage point: the Eurasian Development Bank 7.9 per cent in June, the EBRD 7.5 per cent on 24 September, and the IMF 6.8 per cent in its 2026 Article IV consultation.

    Uzbekistan's state banks now have a published sale list. What they do not have is a sale date. A presidential decree of 28 August put the state's 98.9 per cent holding in Turonbank up for public auction, an asset-management official said in September that Asakabank "could be one of the first" large bank sold, and the EBRD's country head told an audience in Tashkent that completing the Asakabank and SQB sales "will be a tectonic shift in Uzbekistan's banking sector". None of it yet touches the feature that makes state ownership matter: roughly a third of bank credit is still directed or preferential.

    A list of assets, not a calendar

    The decree of 28 August 2026, "On additional measures to reduce the state's participation in the economy and accelerate privatization processes", lists state stakes in 62 enterprises for public auction over 2026-2027, Spot.uz reports. Turonbank appears at 98.9 per cent, alongside Humo Air, Uzexpocentre (91.83 per cent) and the insurer Xalq Sug'urta. Turonbank's sale is assigned to the Ministry of Economy and Finance, to be carried out "taking into account the conclusions of international consultants and the bank's readiness for privatization". The decree gives no auction date, and none had been announced as of 2 October.

    That conditionality is how the decree sits alongside the February schedule rather than contradicting it. UzDaily reported on 19 February that the updated "Uzbekistan-2030" strategy, approved on 16 February, holds the number of state banks at nine through 2026 before cutting it to seven in 2027, six in 2028, five in 2029 and four in 2030; the nine it names include Uzpromstroybank, Asakabank and Turonbank. The 16 February decree published on lex.uz sets out the year's reform priorities and carries no bank-sale schedule of its own. The August decree therefore authorises preparation and auction inside a two-year window; it does not commit the state to closing a bank sale in 2026.

    Asakabank and SQB

    Asakabank is the nearer transaction. On 2 January the Ministry of Economy and Finance, the EBRD and the bank announced agreement on key commercial terms under which the EBRD would take a 15 per cent stake during 2026, subject to transactional, regulatory and corporate conditions. The EBRD's own project disclosure records the bank as state-held through the Fund for Reconstruction and Development (87.77 per cent) and the finance ministry (9.38 per cent). On 17 September Alisher Miraliyev of the Agency for Management of State Assets told Spot.uz that "the consultants are working" and that, as it becomes ready, "Asakabank could be one of the first" — while indicating the sale would most likely not be completed by the end of 2026. Meanwhile $95 million of budget money is to be added to the bank's capital and close to 2 trillion soums of ministry debt may be converted into equity.

    SQB is the larger case, and worth naming precisely. SQB is the brand of JSCB "Uzpromstroybank"; the bank's own corporate and investor pages give that legal name. The "Uzpromstroybank" in the February list of state banks and the "SQB" in privatisation coverage are therefore one institution, not two. The Asian Development Bank, which signed a $50 million senior convertible loan in 2023 explicitly to support the bank's privatisation, describes it as the second-largest state-owned bank in the country. Its shareholders now include the National Investment Fund (UzNIF), which the finance ministry capitalised by transferring 20 to 40 per cent stakes in 18 state enterprises and commercial banks, and which listed in London and Tashkent in May 2026, raising $603.6 million. Published figures for UzNIF's specific holding in SQB conflict, so the usable fact is structural: part of SQB's state stake now sits inside a Franklin Templeton-managed, publicly listed vehicle instead of with a ministry.

    Directed lending is the binding constraint

    The Uzbekistan Financial Sector Assessment Program puts the problem in numbers. Around 30 per cent of total banking-sector lending was directed or preferential at end-2024, about half its 2018 share; within that, 38.4 per cent of state commercial banks' lending was on preferential terms, against 3.1 per cent at private domestic banks and 20.2 per cent at foreign-owned ones. The nine state banks still hold roughly two-thirds of system assets. The IMF's 2026 Article IV mission was blunt: "Government lending programs with quantitative lending targets result in credit misallocation toward unviable borrowers," and it listed "phasing out — and improving the transparency of — directed and preferential lending programs" among its priorities, alongside accelerated bank privatisation.

    At the Tashkent event on 30 September the IMF's resident representative, Koba Gvenetadze, acknowledged that preferential and targeted lending programmes run through the state banks and said their scale should decline as the economy develops. The EBRD's lead regional policy specialist, Asel Aitkhozhina, said the "high share of subsidised lending, characteristic of both Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, weakens the impact of central bank interest-rate decisions on the economy".

    That is not abstract while policy is tight. The Central Bank held its rate at 14 per cent on 16 September — unchanged since March 2025, as the IMF notes — with August headline inflation at 6.2 per cent and core at 5.5 per cent, citing the persistence of upside risks and noting that "the growth rate of credit to the economy is gradually moving toward more moderate levels". It targets 5 per cent inflation by the end of 2027 and meets again on 28 October. Where a third of credit is priced off state programmes rather than the policy rate, tight money falls disproportionately on unsubsidised borrowers.

    The macro backdrop is strong and genuinely contested. The EBRD, on 24 September, projected growth of 7.5 per cent in 2026 and 6 per cent in 2027 after 8.5 per cent year on year in the first half. The Eurasian Development Bank's June outlook had 7.9 per cent for 2026; the IMF's 2026 Article IV projects 6.8 per cent. That spread is the range the consultants valuing these banks will be arguing over.

    What to watch

    • Whether an auction date for the 98.9 per cent Turonbank stake is published, and whether the sale is struck inside the decree's 2026-2027 window.
    • Completion of the EBRD's 15 per cent Asakabank stake, and whether the conditions announced on 2 January are met before year-end.
    • The Central Bank's 28 October decision, and whether preferential lending is cited as a reason to stay tight.
    • Disclosure of UzNIF's actual stake in SQB, which would settle the conflicting published figures.

    Ownership change is easy to announce; credit allocation is the thing worth measuring. On the FSAP's numbers, selling banks is necessary but will not by itself shift the third of lending that still follows state direction.

    Sources

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