India Shapes BRICS+ Summit Agenda Toward Development Finance Reform, Resisting Anti-Dollar Consensus

Background

India assumed the BRICS chairmanship in January 2026, marking its second chairmanship since the grouping expanded to BRICS+ in 2024 with the formal accession of Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Ethiopia, Iran, and Egypt as new members alongside the original five. India's approach to international groupings including BRICS, the G20, and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation reflects its multi-alignment foreign policy, which seeks to maximise influence across multiple institutional frameworks without committing to any single geopolitical bloc. India's BRICS participation is driven primarily by its interest in reforming global financial governance institutions, securing development finance on terms less conditioned than Western-led institutions typically require, and building South-South solidarity around positions that reflect developing country interests in trade, climate finance, and technology access. India has been consistently sceptical of BRICS initiatives that would antagonise Western powers, particularly proposals for a common currency, alternative payment systems to SWIFT, or formal coordination mechanisms that would give China disproportionate institutional influence. Under the chairmanship, India sought to focus BRICS+ on areas where it could build genuine consensus across the now eleven-member grouping, including infrastructure finance, pharmaceutical access, climate adaptation funding, and food security, while managing the Russian and Chinese push for more explicitly anti-Western financial architecture.

Summit Outcomes

The New Delhi Declaration adopted at the October 15 summit closing plenary reflects India's priorities while accommodating the minimum consensus positions of Russia and China. The most substantive financial agreement is the expansion of the BRICS Contingency Reserve Arrangement, a mutual liquidity support mechanism, from its current 100 billion dollar capitalisation to 200 billion dollars, with the expanded arrangement covering all BRICS+ members rather than only the original five. The expanded CRA provides members facing balance of payments difficulties with access to short-term swap lines without the full conditionality requirements of IMF programmes, though the arrangement maintains a linkage to IMF engagement for larger drawings above 30 percent of a member's access limit. The second major financial commitment is the establishment of a BRICS+ Infrastructure Development Fund with initial capitalisation of 50 billion dollars, contributed in proportion to member state GDP, with China and India as the two largest contributors. The fund will be managed by the New Development Bank under revised governance arrangements that give all BRICS+ members board representation and that adopt environmental and social standards comparable to those of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank. India successfully resisted the Russian proposal for a BRICS payment system that would allow cross-border transactions without SWIFT using a BRICS-operated messaging platform, arguing that such a system would expose BRICS members to secondary sanctions risk and would undermine the financial relationships with Western countries that are economically important to most members.

• BRICS Contingency Reserve Arrangement expanded from 100 to 200 billion dollars, extended to all BRICS+ members.
• BRICS+ Infrastructure Development Fund established with 50 billion dollar initial capitalisation.
• Russia's BRICS payment system proposal blocked by India, Saudi Arabia, and UAE.
• New Development Bank governance revised to give all BRICS+ members board representation.

India's Diplomatic Management

India's diplomatic management of the BRICS+ summit reflected the Modi government's sophisticated understanding of multi-alignment as a positive-sum rather than zero-sum approach to international relations. By blocking the Russian payment system proposal while advancing genuine reform of development finance architecture, India demonstrated that it can exercise leadership within BRICS+ without the grouping's agenda being captured by Sino-Russian anti-Western positioning. This distinction is important for India's relationships with Western partners, which have grown substantially more interdependent through the Quad, the India-US Initiative on Critical and Emerging Technology, and EU-India trade negotiations. Western governments, while concerned about BRICS as a potential vehicle for undermining Western-led financial institutions, have responded positively to India's moderating role, with US Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen stating in September 2026 that Washington 'views India's BRICS chairmanship as a constructive force for reform of international institutions rather than their replacement'. China's response to India's summit management was publicly cooperative but privately frustrated, according to diplomatic sources, with Beijing having sought greater emphasis on dedollarisation and greater resistance to Western financial institution conditionality. Russia was more openly critical, with Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov describing the summit outcome as 'too cautious' in a press conference following the declaration's adoption. Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and the African BRICS+ members were supportive of India's approach, sharing its preference for reform of existing institutions over the creation of parallel structures that could trigger Western economic countermeasures.

Sources

• Reuters
• The Hindu
• Financial Times
• New Development Bank
• Ministry of External Affairs India