Poland plans for deniable strikes, not an invasion

Poland spent September 2026 preparing its population for a kind of attack that its leaders say they do not expect to turn into war. On 17 September, the anniversary of the Soviet invasion of 1939, Prime Minister Donald Tusk told the Sejm that, according to intelligence from allied services, Russia's plans include drone and missile strikes on countries that support Ukraine, presented afterwards as accidents. The same day the air force began preventive patrols over the east of the country. Within ten days the government had joined a European anti-ballistic missile project, announced a threefold expansion of sirens along the Ukrainian border and published instructions on where to take cover. Moscow rejects the premise. Russia's Foreign Ministry called the accusations ‘contrived’ and ‘far-fetched’.

The shape of Warsaw's response matters more than its rhetoric. Poland is not mobilising against an invasion; Tusk said explicitly that ‘there is nothing to suggest an invasion’. It is trying to strip away the ambiguity on which, in its own assessment, a campaign of deniable incidents would depend. In practice that means detecting and naming incidents quickly, telling the public what happened and making civil protection routine rather than exceptional.

What happened on the border

The trigger was a run of incidents close to or across the frontier. On 13 September a Russian drone hit the locomotive of a Kyiv–Warsaw passenger train in Ukraine's Volyn region, about two kilometres from the Polish border. The crew had been warned in advance and passengers were evacuated without injury, according to Notes from Poland. The same night a truck was struck about 800 metres from the Dorohusk–Jagodzin crossing. Poland's interior ministry reported no injuries on the Polish side and no violation of Polish airspace. Interior Minister Marcin Kierwiński nonetheless called the strikes ‘Russian terrorist attacks’.

In the following days, NPR reported, the Polish military recovered a Russian drone carrying a warhead off the north-western coast, and NATO jets shot down a drone in Lithuanian airspace. On 23 September Poland's Operational Command said a Russian Mi-8 helicopter from Kaliningrad had crossed into Polish airspace north of Braniewo at 11:08, reaching a depth of about 300 metres and staying for roughly 42 seconds. Fighters were scrambled. The command said the incident showed that Russia was ‘once again testing the readiness of our air defence’. No Russian comment on the helicopter was reported.

Two earlier events frame Polish planning. In September 2025 about 20 Russian drones entered Polish airspace, some were shot down by NATO aircraft, and Warsaw invoked Article 4 of the North Atlantic Treaty. In July 2026 a Russian Kh-101 cruise missile crashed in a field in Lublin province during a mass strike on Ukraine; prosecutors later said it carried a ‘significant amount’ of explosive.

The intelligence claim and Moscow's denial

Tusk said the purpose of disguised strikes would be to weaken NATO members' willingness to respond collectively and to show that Article 5 ‘exists only in theory’. He attributed the assessment to US, Ukrainian and allied services without specifying which. He also said that announcements by ‘some global leaders’ about Russia's readiness for a ceasefire had not come true, a reference to statements by US President Donald Trump.

The Russian position is a flat denial. Besides the Foreign Ministry's response, Moscow has denied that it targets NATO states, Al Jazeera reported. The underlying intelligence has not been published, so the claim of intent cannot be tested from open sources and should be read as a stated government assessment. What can be checked is the record of incidents, which is consistent with a rising volume of long-range fire in the war as a whole. Speaking at the United Nations, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky said Russia had used more than 2,100 missiles and 63,000 drones against Ukraine since the start of 2026. Ukraine's own strikes have also grown: on 23 September it carried out what Al Jazeera described as its largest combined air attack, aimed at refineries in Moscow, Samara and Bashkortostan. The closer both sides' long-range campaigns come to NATO territory, the more stray or deliberate incidents Poland has to sort.

From air policing to civil defence

The most concrete change is on the ground. Lublin province, which borders Ukraine and Belarus, had about 30 remotely operated sirens in early 2024. It now has about 350 and plans more than 1,000 by the end of 2026. The government also plans a Cell Broadcast mobile alert system by the end of the year, has identified nearly 3,500 shelters in the province and says more than 630,000 people have been trained in emergency procedures.

On 25 September the interior ministry published national guidance on responding to air attacks. It lists about 85,000 shelter points able to hold 23.7 million people, around 64 per cent of the population. Building owners must mark them by the end of the year with the international civil-defence sign, a blue triangle on an orange background, and a green ‘Punkt schronienia’ plate. Earlier in 2026, 17 million households received a safety handbook. Separate instructions were issued for schools after evacuation procedures in Lublin province drew criticism.

These numbers describe designated places, not purpose-built bunkers. The guidance itself tells people who cannot reach a shelter to move to a central room without windows. The capacity figure is therefore a measure of organisation more than of physical protection, and it will be tested by drills rather than by headcounts.

A European layer and an American one

On 18 September Tusk said Poland had joined the European Anti-Ballistic Missile Coalition, set up in July 2026 by Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, the United Kingdom and Ukraine. The group aims to build an integrated European defence against ballistic missiles. Its Freyja prototype, with the Ukrainian manufacturer Fire Point as lead industrial partner, is targeted for the first half of 2027 and is presented as a cheaper alternative to US-made Patriot systems. Zelensky said Ukraine had ‘unique technologies developed during the war’ to share with Polish partners.

Warsaw is pursuing the American track at the same time. In the same week Trump announced progress towards a permanent US Army base in Poland, with two sites in western Poland under consideration, according to NPR. The two tracks do not compete in the short term. A European anti-ballistic system will not exist before 2027 at the earliest, so the patrols Poland stepped up this month rely on F-16s, helicopters and existing ground-based defences.

What the measures can and cannot do

The approach has one clear strength: it is useful under either reading of events. If Tusk's assessment is right, faster detection, public disclosure and a prepared population reduce the political payoff of an incident that is later called an accident. If incidents are unintended spillover from strikes on western Ukraine, as Moscow's denials imply, the same sirens, alerts and shelter points still reduce harm. Policy that does not depend on proving intent is easier to sustain across allies who read Russian motives differently.

The limits are also clear. Sirens and shelter points do nothing to stop a missile, and the anti-ballistic project is a prototype with a 2027 target. Nor can the effect on deterrence be observed: a quiet month would not show whether preparation worked. And publicising intelligence warnings carries its own risk, since a warning that is not followed by an incident can be presented by critics as alarmism.

What to watch

Four markers will show whether September was a turning point or a spike. The first is whether the Cell Broadcast system and shelter marking are finished by the end of 2026, as promised. The second is the frequency of airspace incidents and of Polish air-defence activations over the winter, as long-range strikes on western Ukraine continue.The third is whether NATO allies converge on a common standard for attributing incidents, which would blunt the ambiguity Warsaw is worried about. The fourth is whether the Freyja prototype keeps to its 2027 date. For now, Poland has made its choice: prepare the home front for incidents that may be hard to attribute, and name them fast.

Sources

• Notes from Poland — Russia planning ‘accidental’ strikes on eastern NATO states, warns Poland (18 September 2026)
• NPR via KPBS — Poland's prime minister warns of Russian ‘accidental’ attacks on Ukraine's allies (18 September 2026)
• Notes from Poland — Drone hits Kyiv-Warsaw train close to Polish border during Russian attacks on Ukraine (13 September 2026)
• Euronews — Russian military helicopter violates Polish airspace, fighter jets scrambled (23 September 2026)
• Al Jazeera — Poland boosts air defence after ‘Russian provocations’ amid Ukraine war (25 September 2026)
• Notes from Poland — Poland to expand warning siren network along Ukraine border amid Russian attacks (21 September 2026)
• Notes from Poland — Poland issues guidance on responding to air attacks and warns of Russia threat (25 September 2026)
• Notes from Poland — Poland joins European Anti-Ballistic Missile Coalition (18 September 2026)