Russia's money channels into Central Asia are narrowing from both ends

Ten weeks after the European Union sanctioned the company at the centre of Zolotaya Korona, the effects are visible in Central Asian data. Zolotaya Korona, a Russian payment system operating since 2003, had been one of the last major Russian payment systems to escape Western sanctions. In August, transfers by individuals between Russia and Kazakhstan fell by more than 90 per cent. Kyrgyzstan's central bank has removed the system from one of its registers. A Tajik bank has begun closing cards opened remotely by Russian clients, and Moscow has capped how many rubles can leave the country in cash. The channels that carried money between Russia and the region since 2022 are narrowing from several directions at once.

What the EU listed, and what it did not

The EU's 21st sanctions package, adopted on 23 July, added RNKO Payment Center, the non-bank credit organisation that operates Zolotaya Korona and acts as its settlement centre, and Sifra Bank, which handled part of its international transfers. The listing freezes their assets in the EU and bars EU persons from dealing with them. UAWire notes that a separate entity, ZAO Zolotaya Korona, was not individually listed. The US had sanctioned the system's developer, the Center of Financial Technologies, in August 2024.

That distinction shaped the first response in Tashkent. On 29 July Otabek Tojiddinov, a department head at Uzbekistan's central bank, said that "the system itself, as an international money transfer operator, has not been placed under sanctions" and that the restrictions applied to the bank providing technical services. Uzbek banks kept paying out transfers from Zolotaya Korona's collateral deposits, and were negotiating to move its technical operations to a bank not under sanctions, a switch planned for the following week. Tojiddinov also said that Uzbekistan had no intention of exposing itself to secondary sanctions. Whether the switch took place on schedule has not been reported in the sources reviewed.

What the data show

Kazakhstan shows the sharpest effect. According to data from regulators in Kazakhstan and Georgia analysed by the Russian outlet RBC and reported by Meduza, transfers by individuals from Russia to Kazakhstan fell nearly 12-fold in August to 239m tenge, about 45.5m rubles. Transfers in the other direction fell more than 14-fold to 1.2bn tenge. Transfers from Russia to Georgia fell to $5.1m, the lowest in more than 20 years, and those from Georgia to Russia fell to zero for the first time on record. Both countries host large numbers of Russians who left after 2022, so these flows reflect emigrant money as much as migrant labour.

Uzbekistan's exposure is mainly to migrant wages. The central bank reported $9.3bn in international remittances in the first half of 2026, 13 per cent more than a year earlier. Of that, about $2.4bn, or roughly 26 per cent, came through Zolotaya Korona, according to Gazeta.uz, and not only from Russia; Uzbek workers in South Korea, Türkiye, Kazakhstan and the EU also use it. The central bank judged the effect on consumer prices insignificant and said it had not factored it into its decision to hold the policy rate at 14 per cent.

In Kyrgyzstan, the National Bank revoked Zolotaya Korona's registration as an electronic money system on 21 September, at the operator's own request. 24.kg reports that the system remains listed as an active international money-transfer operator and that eight registrations have been revoked this year. In late September, Eurasianet noted, investigations by the Financial Times and the New York Times described Kyrgyzstan's role in the network of A7, a Russian financial entity accused of helping Moscow evade sanctions. The UK sanctioned A7's Kyrgyz activities in May. During President Sadyr Japarov's visit to New York, Kyrgyz officials signed a memorandum with Citibank to study opening a branch in Bishkek.

Local banks and Moscow add their own limits

Tajikistan's Humo Bank told Russian clients that cards opened remotely would be blocked on 1 October unless the holders came to Tajikistan for biometric identification by 30 September, The Diplomat reports. Humo and the International Bank of Tajikistan had sold five-year dollar and euro cards through intermediaries for roughly 15,000 to 70,000 rubles after Kazakhstan limited non-resident cards in January 2025. In December 2025 Revolut stopped accepting top-ups for EU residents from cards issued in Tajikistan, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. Three Tajik banks holding about a fifth of the country's deposits were placed under EU sanctions in October 2025 and removed in April 2026. The stakes for Dushanbe are high: remittances reached $5.8bn in 2024, equal to 45.3 per cent of GDP, and more than 90 per cent of Tajik–Russian trade payments were settled in rubles.

Moscow is tightening from its own side. A decree signed by Vladimir Putin and published at the end of September limits individuals leaving Russia for Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan and Eurasian Economic Union states to 1m rubles in cash, down from the equivalent of $100,000, Asia-Plus reports. Companies and individual entrepreneurs may not export cash rubles to these countries at all. Larger sums can leave through designated airports with documents showing where the money came from, and amounts over the limit will be confiscated. Russia had already capped exports of foreign-currency cash to EAEU states at $100,000 from 1 April.

What to watch

• September remittance data from Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, which will show whether flows have moved to other operators or slowed overall.
• Whether Uzbek banks completed the move to a non-sanctioned settlement bank, and whether Brussels treats that arrangement as circumvention.
• Further deregistrations by Central Asian central banks, and whether the Citibank talks in Bishkek progress while the A7 reports are still under scrutiny.
• The effect of the cash cap on migrants who carry savings home in person.

The published data so far cover flows between Russia and Kazakhstan and Georgia, where Russian emigrants are a large share of senders. Figures for the migrant corridors to Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan after July have not yet appeared in the sources reviewed, and Uzbekistan's central bank says payouts have continued. The cost is borne in higher fees, slower transfers and more paperwork, which fall hardest on the households that depend on the money most.

Sources

• Meduza — Money transfers between Russia and Kazakhstan fall nearly 12-fold after EU sanctions on Zolotaya Korona payment service
• Kun.uz — Uzbekistan’s banks continue processing Zolotaya Korona remittances despite sanctions
• Gazeta.uz — “Zolotaya Korona” orqali O‘zbekistonga pul o‘tkazmalarini yangi operator orqali qayta tiklash rejalashtirilmoqda — Markaziy bank
• UAWire — EU adds Zolotaya Korona operator Payment Center to sanctions list targeting Russian financial sector
• 24.kg — National Bank removes Zolotaya Korona from electronic money system register
• Eurasianet — Japarov registers successes during US trip, while investigative reports detail sanctions-busting
• The Diplomat — A Tajik Bank Shuts Side Door for Russian Cardholders
• Asia-Plus — Russia limits cash ruble exports to Tajikistan and other CIS countries