Turkmen gas to China: more supply, the same pipe, a disputed number

Turkmenistan is adding gas supply faster than it is adding ways to sell it. In April it committed $5.1bn of its own money to a fourth phase at Galkynysh, its largest field. The only buyer with the capacity to absorb the extra gas is China, and China's own representative says it expects to buy about the same amount this year as last. The fourth pipeline string that would carry more, Line D, is, in Beijing's words, still under discussion.

Two numbers for the same trade

The basic figure is disputed. In an interview taped in Beijing in mid-March and aired by CGTN on 24 March, Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedov, chairman of the People's Council and Turkmenistan's senior leader, said the recent average annual volume of gas shipped to China was about 40 bcm and that the two sides were working towards 65 bcm. Three days later China's ambassador in Ashgabat, Ji Shumin, told reporters that Turkmenistan exported roughly 30 bcm to China in 2025 and that Beijing expected a similar volume in 2026. He added that 65 bcm would need Line D, which "is still under discussion".

The two statements are not measuring quite the same thing. Berdimuhamedov gave an average over recent years; Ji gave a single year. Other estimates fall between them. The Polish Centre for Eastern Studies (OSW) put Turkmen deliveries to China at about 32.5 to 33.5 bcm in 2024, against 31 bcm from Russia. Reuters, reporting the April contract, described Turkmen exports to China as about 30 bcm a year. The spread matters because the existing Lines A, B and C can carry about 55 bcm of Turkmen gas a year. On any of these figures the system has spare room, which means the constraint on volume is commercial rather than physical.

The monthly customs data point the same way. Chinese customs figures reported by Interfax show total pipeline imports of 6.632 bcm in June 2026, down 2% on a year earlier. Turkmen deliveries fell 5%, Uzbek deliveries 60%, and Kazakh deliveries rose 15%. Over the same period Power of Siberia 1 ran at its design capacity of 38 bcm a year, peaking at 112 mcm a day in December and January.

What Phase IV adds

On 16 April Turkmengaz and CNPC Amudarya Petroleum, a CNPC subsidiary, signed a turnkey contract for the fourth phase of Galkynysh. CNPC will build treatment capacity for 10 bcm of commercial gas a year and drill the production wells to feed it. Turkmengaz head Maksat Babaev told Reuters the cost would be $5.1bn and that the gas would serve both the domestic and export markets; a government source said Turkmenistan would finance all of it. Chinese reporting cited by the Jamestown Foundation gives the construction contract held by CNPC's engineering arm as $4.6bn. The difference probably reflects contract scope against total project cost, but neither side has published a breakdown.

The political signal was loud. Chinese Vice Premier Ding Xuexiang attended as Xi Jinping's special representative, and the two governments signed a general agreement on basic principles for natural gas cooperation and a five-year cooperation plan for 2026 to 2030. Ding said China was "ready to enhance the quality of energy cooperation with Turkmenistan". The commercial signal was quieter: Ashgabat carries the capital risk, and the buyer has not said it will take more gas.

Production data show why new wells are needed. Turkmenistan produced 76.5 bcm in 2025, down from 77.6 bcm in 2024. First-half output in 2026 was 39.1 bcm, marginally above the 38.9 bcm of a year earlier, and Babaev has guided to about 76 bcm for the full year. The field's seven-phase plan targets around 200 bcm a year; the country is producing well under half of that across all its fields.

Line D: the pipe that decides the volume

Line D was designed to carry an additional 30 bcm a year on a shorter route through Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan into Xinjiang. Work formally began in 2014, then stalled, reportedly over price. CNPC has said the expanded network would reach 85 bcm a year; Turkmengaz has used 65 bcm. Neither Beijing nor Ashgabat has confirmed that the pricing dispute is resolved, and Reuters described the project in April as long delayed and still under discussion.

For China the delay costs little. Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, once marginal suppliers, are turning into net importers: no Uzbek gas reached China in January or February 2026, and Kazakh deliveries early this year ran near 100 mcm a month. That leaves spare capacity in Lines A, B and C that Turkmen gas could fill without a new pipe. On price, The Diplomat notes that the Turkmen border price slipped below $290 per thousand cubic metres in the second quarter of 2025, consistent with an oil-linked contract. Line D is therefore more valuable to Ashgabat, which needs a firm offtake for Phase IV, than to Beijing, which can take more Turkmen gas through existing lines whenever the price suits it.

The alternatives are small or exposed

Turkmenistan's other routes do not change that balance. The swap with Türkiye through Iran began in March 2025 under a short-term contract for up to 2 bcm a year, with about 120 mcm a month flowing at spot prices. Turkmengaz suspended it in October 2025 after failing to agree price and volume; Babaev said Turkmenistan had other buyers and added: "That's the market." Türkiye's energy minister, Alparslan Bayraktar, said in January that 2026 would see supplies resume and rise. Since then the route has become harder. Iran's own exports to Türkiye were reported halted in March 2026 after a strike damaged South Pars facilities, and a swap depends on the same Iranian network. The Diplomat judged in April that swap deals via Iran were likely a casualty of the regional crisis.

TAPI is moving, but only at its first stage. The Governor of Herat said on 27 August that the Herat section would be finished and brought into use within two months. The full pipeline is planned at about 1,800 km and 33 bcm a year, and the sections through the rest of Afghanistan and into Pakistan and India have no comparable timetable. Gas to Herat is a domestic Afghan market, not an export outlet on China's scale. The trans-Caspian option, covered separately in these pages, has no buyer contract.

What to watch

Three indicators will show whether Phase IV gas finds a market. The first is a Line D commercial agreement with a published volume, rather than another statement of intent. The second is China's monthly customs series: if Turkmen deliveries stay flat while Russian flows remain at capacity, the extra 10 bcm is more likely to serve the domestic market than exports. The third is whether the Iranian swap restarts at all in 2026. Until one of these moves, Turkmenistan's expansion strengthens China's position as the single buyer more than it strengthens Ashgabat's position as the seller.

Sources

• bne IntelliNews (Eurasianet) — China and Turkmenistan cannot get their gas export numbers straight
• Pipeline & Gas Journal (Reuters) — China, Turkmenistan advance Galkynysh gas field Phase 4 with 10 Bcm capacity
• The Diplomat — China and Turkmenistan inaugurate new phase at Galkynysh gas field
• Interfax — Gazprom gas supplies to China via Power of Siberia return to winter highs in June
• The Diplomat — China's quiet pivot to Central Asian gas
• Jamestown Foundation — PRC–Turkmenistan gas ties hedge Hormuz risk
• Interfax — Turkey plans to resume gas imports from Turkmenistan in 2026
• Pajhwok Afghan News — TAPI project in Herat to be completed within 2 months: Governor