Center for Strategic Studies of Eurasia

    Commentary · Sep 23, 2026

    Türkiye’s eastern reach runs through other people’s doors

    Ankara hosts the Turkic states in October with trade rising. But its gas from the east and its rail link to Armenia both depend on decisions taken in Tehran, Ashgabat and Baku.

    Strategic CompetitionTurkey & Middle EastSouth CaucasusCentral Asia
    Aerial view of Baku featuring unique modern architecture and buildings against a clear blue sky.
    Tahir Xəlfəquliyev / Pexels
    Contents

    Key takeaways

    • Türkiye’s trade with Organization of Turkic States members rose 6.6 per cent year on year to $10.1 billion in January–July 2026, according to its Trade Ministry.
    • Türkiye imported 2.72 bcm of Iranian gas in March–May 2026, up from 1.95 bcm a year earlier, before the 25-year contract ran out at the end of July with no new long-term deal announced.
    • Azerbaijan supplied Türkiye with 4.9 bcm of gas in the first half of 2026, unchanged on a year earlier, while its exports to Europe fell from 6.1 to 5.9 bcm.
    • The Akyaka–Gyumri rail section is roughly 18–20 km long; a local Turkish mayor said in July that restoration would take two to three months, but the border it crosses has been closed since 1993.

    Türkiye will host the leaders of the Organization of Turkic States (OTS) in late October with a good story to tell. Its trade with the member states is growing, its president has just told the UN General Assembly that relations with Armenia are moving forward, and its energy minister speaks of Caspian gas reaching Türkiye directly. The story is sound as far as it goes. But the two physical links that would turn Ankara’s eastern diplomacy into infrastructure, gas from Central Asia and rail to Armenia, both pass through doors that other governments hold. That is the most useful lens for reading the Ankara summit.

    What the summit will showcase

    According to Burhanettin Duran, the Turkish presidency’s communications director, OTS foreign ministers will meet on 29 October and leaders on 30 October. Mr Duran said Ankara wants to deepen the organisation’s institutional integration and raise its global profile, and the stated agenda leans towards digital infrastructure, education and mobility rather than hard projects. The trade numbers support the optimism. Türkiye’s Trade Ministry reported trade with OTS members of $10.1 billion in January–July 2026, up 6.6 per cent on a year earlier. In 2025 Kazakhstan was the largest partner at $7.8 billion, followed by Azerbaijan at $4.3 billion, Uzbekistan at $3.1 billion and Kyrgyzstan at $1.6 billion.

    Those are real but modest sums for an economy of Türkiye’s size, and they say little about the direction of travel of goods or energy. Trade can grow through third-country routes. Energy and rail cannot: they need specific lines, and specific neighbours willing to let them run.

    The gas door is in Tehran

    Iran supplied Türkiye with 7.7 bcm of gas in 2025, 13.2 per cent of its imports, according to Türkiye Today. The 25-year Iranian contract, in force since 2001, allowed up to 9.6 bcm a year and ran out at the end of July 2026. Its terms provided for automatic renewal for five years unless either side gave notice. Before the expiry, Energy Minister Alparslan Bayraktar said an extension could be discussed but that no negotiations were under way. Talks were overshadowed by the conflict between Iran and the United States that began in March. In August, Energy Intelligence reported that supplies were likely to continue after expiry under a make-up clause in the contract. We found no public announcement of a new long-term contract by the date of this piece, and neither government has set out the legal basis for current deliveries, so the status is best described as unresolved.

    What is clear is that Türkiye leaned on Iranian gas more, not less, this year. Türkiye Today put March–May 2026 imports at 2.72 bcm against 1.95 bcm a year before, a rise of almost 40 per cent.

    This matters for Central Asia because Türkiye’s only route for Turkmen gas also runs through Iran. The swap arrangement through Iran, which began in March 2025, was designed for up to 2 bcm a year. It was suspended in October 2025; Turkmengaz’s chairman said at the time that if the two sides could not agree on volumes or price, Turkmenistan had other buyers. In January 2026 Mr Bayraktar said the year would be important for “starting Turkmen gas supplies and increasing their levels”. We found no public announcement, by the date of this piece, that deliveries had resumed. The Trans-Caspian pipeline that would remove Iran from the chain remains a plan.

    Azerbaijan is the reliable door, and it is not widening

    Azerbaijan is the supplier that performs. It sent Türkiye 4.9 bcm in the first half of 2026, unchanged on a year earlier, and Europe 5.9 bcm, down from 6.1 bcm. Total Azerbaijani exports rose to 12.7 bcm from 12.1 bcm; the growth went to other buyers, including Georgia and Syria. In January Türkiye signed a 15-year deal for 2.25 bcm a year from the Absheron field, but deliveries are due to start only in 2029. Baku can keep Türkiye supplied; it is not, on current output, in a position to give Ankara much more gas to resell west. The “gas hub” idea therefore still depends on eastern volumes that Türkiye does not yet have contracted.

    The rail door is in Baku as much as in Yerevan

    The Armenian file shows the same pattern in a different form. The Armenia–Türkiye joint working group on the Kars–Gyumri railway met in Kars on 28 April. The two foreign ministries’ readouts stressed the importance of early operation of the line but, as Azatutyun noted, announced no concrete agreements beyond technical studies. The US embassy in Yerevan called the meeting “historic progress”. On the Turkish side, work has started. In July the mayor of Akyaka, Ergüder Toptaş, told Armenpress that restoration of the 18–20 km Akyaka–Gyumri section could be finished in two to three months and that tenders had been issued for the track and a connecting road.

    Finishing the track does not open the border, which Türkiye closed in 1993. The mayor himself said opening depended on Armenia–Azerbaijan normalisation. Azatutyun reported that a 2022 understanding to let holders of diplomatic passports cross had still not been applied, and that Turkish leaders continue to link normalisation to a settlement between Armenia and Azerbaijan acceptable to Baku. Armenian officials have voiced frustration; parliament speaker Alen Simonyan complained in April that Ankara was not taking new steps. Turkish officials, for their part, describe steady progress. On 22 September Recep Tayyip Erdoğan told the General Assembly, as reported by Armenpress, that Türkiye had “moved forward in the process of normalising our relations with Armenia” and said he hoped for durable peace between Armenia and Azerbaijan.

    Both readings can be true. Ankara is preparing the infrastructure so that it can move quickly, while keeping the decision to open tied to the Armenia–Azerbaijan track. That sequencing protects its relationship with Baku, its most dependable gas supplier and a founding OTS member. It also means the timing is not wholly Ankara’s to set.

    What to watch

    Three things will show whether Türkiye’s eastern reach is turning into routes. First, whether Ankara and Tehran put Iranian supplies back on a formal contractual footing, and on what volumes; that also decides whether the Turkmen swap can restart. Second, whether the Ankara summit produces anything on energy or transport with dates and money attached, rather than declarations on digital cooperation. Third, whether the Kars–Gyumri track, once finished, is followed by the diplomatic-passport crossing agreed in 2022, which would be the first low-cost test of political will on the border.

    Our view is that Türkiye’s position in the region is stronger than its infrastructure suggests, and that its infrastructure is weaker than its rhetoric suggests. For policymakers and investors, the practical lesson is to price Turkish-led projects on the consent of the transit and partner states involved, not on Ankara’s stated intentions alone.

    Sources

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